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Twitchell: Casual Nexus: What Must be Shown for Standing to Sue in Federal C

NOTES
THE CAUSAL NEXUS: WHAT MUST BE SHOWN FOR
STANDING TO SUE IN FEDERAL COURTS*
INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult standing questions facing the federal courts
today is determining when it is proper to grant standing to plaintiffs whose
injuries, although personal, are only indirectly or remotely related to the
challenged government action. City councilmen claiming that a proposed
highway interchange will eventually pollute their town's water supply;'
consumers claiming that a failure to appoint certain members to a government commission will eventually raise the price of gas and oil;2 indigents
claiming that the Internal Revenue Service has issued a ruling which
illegally deprives them of needed medical care3 -such plaintiffs regularly seek
federal forums for their complaints. In deciding whether these plaintiffs
have standing to be heard, the courts must determine what showing of
causal relationship between the challenged act and the alleged injury must
be offered to satisfy the minimum constitutional requirement for invoking
the court's jurisdiction.
The problem of attenuated causal relationships between act and injury
has become particularly acute in recent years because of the increasingly
complex nature of our society. On the one hand, a growing public awareness of extended causal relationships has led many citizens to seek judicial
protection from remote causes of injury, although those injuries might be
light-years away. 4 On the other hand, the very complexity that creates these
attenuated relationships presents the courts with new problems both in
identifying the extent to which specific acts indeed cause injuries 5 and in
making policy decisions as to how far the judiciary will provide a forum
to remedy injuries created by remote causes. 6 Although these questions are
sometimes resolved at later stages of litigation, 7 they are often decided at
the threshold standing level.
*EDITOR's

NOTE:

This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize

for the best student note submitted in the Summer 1976 quarter.
1. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. See Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1976).
3. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), (plaintiff environmental group
alleged that the challenged development of Mineral King Valley in California would
"impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations"). Id. at 734.
5. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1 (1972).
6. See Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Tucker, The Metamorphosis
of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 929 (1972); Cappelletti, Governmental
and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study,
73 MicH. L. REV. 793, 854-56 (1975).
7. See notes 50, 60 infra.
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Two additional problems contribute to the confusion when there is
an attenuated chain of causality: (1) the sharply conflicting attitudes of the
Warren and Burger Courts toward the proper function of the standing
doctrine," and (2) the inherent theoretical weakness of the "injury in fact"
test in weighing the proper elements for a standing decision. 9 The result has
been an increased incidence of standing decisions couched in causal language
without a corresponding theoretical development. 10 This lack of constructive analysis on the Supreme Court level has forced the lower federal
courts to develop their own ad hoc causality approaches, most of which
are better understood in terms of underlying policy decisions than in terms
of strict causal considerations.
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court have taken a
new approach toward standing when there are questions of attenuated
causal relationships. In Warth v. Seldin"1 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization,s the Court applied a strict new test for determining when groups alleging remote or indirect injury should be denied
standing.-3 The Court's use of this test raises disturbing questions both
about the ability of such groups to gain standing in the future and about
an expansion of the "causal nexus" test into areas where plaintiffs have
traditionally been granted standing.
The purpose of this note is to examine standing doctrine to determine
what role causal considerations can and should play in determining whether
the court hears a particular plaintiff's case. The note will first briefly examine
the functions that a causal showing serves in a standing determination,
particularly as it relates to the question of injury in fact. It will then analyze
the Supreme Court's treatment of the causal requirement in recent standing

8. For a discussion of the recent expansion and contraction of the standing doctrine
A. MILLER, & E. COOVER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
[hereinafter cited as WIGHr & MILLER]. Much has been written
about the expansion of standing under the Warren Court; see, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. R1v. 450 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Liberalized Law];
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers &r Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, The Citizen

see generally, C. WIrr,
JURISDICTION § 3531 (1975)

as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1033 (1968); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Sedler, Standing,
Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 487-88 (1972);
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1973);

Tucker, supra note 6. Less has been written on the recent Supreme Court trend to contract standing. See Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial
Supremacy? 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 467 (1976); Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible
Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Possible Alternative];
Note, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 Am. U.L.
REv. 835 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Demise]; Note, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 HOFSTRA

L. REV. 383 (1976).
9. See text accompanying notes 40-59 infra.
10. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
11. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
12. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
13. See text accompanying notes 109-112 and notes 145-150 infra.
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cases, contrasting its most liberal position, taken in United States v. SCRAP,14
with the stricter test developed in Warth and Eastern Kentucky. Finally the
note will look at the treatment of causality in standing cases in the
lower courts to determine when the courts may be expected to follow
SCRAP's liberal lead and under what circumstances a court may turn in
the future to the Warth/Eastern Kentucky causality rule.
CAUSALITY IN STANDING DOCTRINE

Causal considerations play a vital if only recently articulated role in the
analysis of standing. Courts have always implicitly recognized the need for a
causal relationship between act and injury for standing to exist.15 Yet the
early development of standing doctrine placed little emphasis on the requisite
causal relationship, since in most cases it was the legal status of the plaintiff
16
and not the fact of his injury that was at issue.
It was the Warren Court's eradication of the strict "legal interest"
approach to standing, 17 along with its recognition of new interests deserving
of protection, 18 that eventually made questions of actual causality an important part of standing analysis. In both constitutional and statutory cases
as old barriers to standing were dissolved, judicial attention shifted to the
actual injury of which the plaintiff complained. Both Baker v. Carr19 and
Flast v. Cohen 20 focused on the "personal stake" of the plaintiff alleging infringement of a constitutionally protected right; Flast further addressed the
"logical nexus" between the status of the plaintiff and his claim.21 In Associa14. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
16. For discussion of earlier standing law and the "legal interest" test, see authorities
cited in note 8 svora. For the purposes of this note it is sufficient to recognize that since
emphasis was on legal status and not on injury, the causal element rarely arose as an
issue in pre-Warren standing cases, except in a few instances of speculative injury. See
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488 (1927). The
notable exception is Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), where the Court held
that to have standing the plaintiff must show "not only that the statute is invalid,
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally." Id. at 488. This "directness" test was echoed in Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 153 (1951) (whether a person consequentially harmed by government action
can challenge the action depends on the directness of the impact of the action on him),
but has since been repudiated in such cases as Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975).
Some lower federal court cases used causality considerations as a means of defining duty
and thereby limiting plaintiff's right of action, much as "policy cause" is used in tort
law. Sometimes these decisions were based on a finding of "no standing." See, e.g., Philco
Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Note,
Standing to Protest and Appeal the Issuance of Broadcasting Licenses: A Constricted
Concept Redefined, 68 YALE L.J. 783 (1959).
17. See authorities cited in note 8 supra for discussion of this change.
18. Davis, Liberalized Law, supra note 8, at 450.
19. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
20. 392 U.S. 83, 91-101 (1968).
21. Id. at 102 (1968). Scott, supra note 8, at 661-62, criticizes the logical nexus text as
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tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 22 the Court
adopted a similarly flexible test for statutory standing cases, which dis23
tinguished between the constitutional and prudential aspects of standing.
First, to meet Article III case or controversy requirements a plaintiff must
allege "that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic
or otherwise." 24 Thus a causal requirement was explicitly made part of
the constitutional standing requirement. Second, as an exercise of its prudential powers, the Court limited standing to those plaintiffs whose interests
were "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
25
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
A key part of the Data Processing decision is the Court's distinction
between the constitutional and prudential dimensions of the standing
doctrine. Although it is difficult to separate the two, the constitutional standing requirement is recognized as an expression of the Article III case or
controversy limitation on the Court's exercise of its power.2 6 This limitation
meets not only the judiciary's internal need for cases susceptible of judicial
resolution, but also the external need of federalism to put some constraints
on the power of the court vis et vis coequal branches of the federal government.2 7 Beyond these threshold constitutional constraints the Court has also
recognized its power to refuse to hear cases it might constitutionally entertain,
as an act of judicial self-governance.28 The policy factors that might under"untenable," since it does nothing to assure a personal stake and lends itself to generalized
citizens' suits. However weak the tests, "[e]ach of these cases contributed to a tone of
openness, summoning the judiciary to turn away from past principles which served to
insulate government officials from challenges by litigants in a variety of circumstances."
Tucker, supra note 6, at 920.
22. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
23. See notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text.
24. 397 U.S. at 152.
25. id. at 153.
26. "In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff
has made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant within the
The Art. III
meaning of Art. IU. This is the threshold question in every federal case ....
judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally." Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500.
27. See Demise, supra note 8, at 841-43. "While the innate limitation of adversity is
concerned with the ability of the courts to decide an issue within the structure of the
judicial system, the separation of powers limitation involves the relationship of the
judiciary to the other branches, that is, the judiciary may not decide issues committed to
resolution through those other branches." Id. at 842-43.
28. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Broderick, supra note 8, at 517-34; Demise, supra note 8, at 843-45. How far standing
limitations are "prudential" has been subject to much controversy. In his dissent to
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974), Justice Douglas
argued that "[t]he requirement of 'standing' to sue is a judicially created instrument
serving several ends: (1) It protects the status quo by reducing the challenges that may be
made to it and to its institutions .

. .

. (2) It sometimes is used to bar from the courts

questions which by the Constitution are left to the other two coordinate branches to
resolve, vis., the so-called political question. (3) It is at times a way of ridding court
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lie higher judicially imposed standing requirements include a reluctance to
adjudicate difficult constitutional questions,2 9 a desire to allocate limited
judicial resources more effectively,30 and a determination to leave certain
31
decisions to other branches of the federal or state governments.
The two-pronged Data Processing test, which distinguishes between the
plaintiff's injury and his protected interests, is peculiarly susceptible to
classification on the basis of constitutional/prudential standing dimensions.
Courts have uniformly recognized "injury in fact" as the sole constitutional
criterion for standing;3 2 the distinction between the statutory injury in fact
test and the constitutional nexus test has been so blurred in recent years
that courts have generally accepted the injury in fact test as the constitutional minimum in both types of cases. 33 The more discredited "zone of
interests" test, despite widespread academic criticism and some judicial disfavor,-3 has retained its vitality in statutory standing cases,3 5 and is often an
dockets whether of abstract questions or questions involving no concrete controversial issue."
Id. at 229 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Concurring in Schlesinger's companion case, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 185
(1974), Justice Stewart also implied that there is a large measure of discretion in a court's
decision not to grant standing, and discussed the policy reasons for restricting standing:
"Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power.
It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would
significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level . . . . I also believe
that repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branches
and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial
to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint." Id. at 188 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added, footnote omitted). The Burger majority, on the other hand,
sees the question of citizen and taxpayer standing as a limitation by constitutional
constraint rather than by judicial self-restraint. See the majority opinions in Schlesinger,
supra, at 209-28, and in Richardson, supra, at 171-80. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975), Justice Powell recognized the prudential aspect of standing only insofar as it usually
poses a bar to a "generalized grievance" or to a plaintiff asserting the rights of another.
29. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936).
30. See generally Scott, sulrra note 8.
31. This prudential limitation is in addition to the constitutional separation of powers
restraint, and involves judicial deference to other branches of both state and federal
government. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 185 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
32. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1924 (1976);
Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 592 (2d Cir. 1976).
33. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th
Cir. 1975); Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
34. Sedler, supra note 8, at 486, calls the zone of interests test "functionally irrelevant,"
and many courts and commentators seem to agree. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
made no mention of the test, and the District of Columbia courts have indicated that the
test may be unnecessary for standing. See Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v.
Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d
859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
See also Liberalized Law, supra note 8; but see text accompanying notes 55-57 infra.
35. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Prince
George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975); Rhode Island Comm'n
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important element in determining injury in fact.36
Since the injury in fact test focuses on the plaintiff's actual injury, causal
considerations have become increasingly important in standing decisions.
Two issues must be decided in determining whether the requisite causal
relationship between act and injury exists for standing purposes: whether
a cause in fact relationship exists, and whether the court should impose any
limits on the class of plaintiffs who claim that a remote action is causing or
will cause them injury. These two questions are analogous to the distinction
made between cause in fact and policy cause in tort cases. In tort law, the
cause in fact question must be decided by the trier of fact,

37

applying either

a "but for" or a "substantial factor" test to eliminate those actions not

causally related to the plaintiff's injury.3 8 The policy cause question, on the
other hand, is for the judge: whether as a matter of law the defendant should
be held responsible for the consequences of his actions in this particular
case.3 9
CAUSE IN FAcT

Similar distinctions between cause in fact and policy cause may be
made in analyzing causality for standing purposes. On the surface the only
causal question relevant to the injury in fact determination should be the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations of a causal relationship. However,
just as in tort law, distinctions between cause in fact and policy cause
determinations are almost impossible to make. 40 Inherent in the injury in
on Energy v. General Serv. Admin., 397 F. Supp. 41 (D.R.I. 1975). The test has even
been applied in constitutional cases. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975);
Construction Ind. Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.s. 934 (1976).
36. See City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 893-95 (D. Conn. 1976); and note
205 infra.
37. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236-37 (4th ed. 1971).
38. The "but for" test really only serves to eliminate one act as a cause of another if
the event would have occurred without it. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 238-39. Prosser,

however, prefers the "substantial factor" test, which finds that "[t]he defendant's conduct
is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing
it about." Id. at 240.
39. "Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact been one of the
causes of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether the defendant should
be legally responsible for what he has caused. Unlike the fact of causation, with which it
is often hopelessly confused, this is essentially a problem of law." Id. at 244. Although
articulated in causal language, the question merges with one of duty. As Prosser points
out, the issue is "whether the policy of law will extend the responsibility for the conduct
to the consequences which have in fact occurred. Quite often this has been stated, and
properly so, as an issue of whether the defendant is under any duty to the plaintiff...
This is not a question of causation, or even a question of fact . . . and the attempt
to deal with it in such terms has led and can lead only to utter confusion." Id.
40. Prosser's description of the confusion surrounding causality issues in tort law
accurately describes the problem in standing law as well: "Much of this confusion is due
to the fact that no one problem is involved, but a number of different problems, which
are not distinguished clearly, and that language appropriate to a discussion of one is
carried over to cast a shadow upon the others." Prosser, supra note 37, at 236. The
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41
fact analysis are policy decisions not only about the sufficiency of the injury,
but also about the type of showing that the plaintiff must make that his
42
injury has or will actually result from the challenged action. The court
must first decide whether it will permit reasonable inferences to fill in certain
gaps in the causal chain; 43 and second, whether the plaintiff will be required
to allege and demonstrate that "but for" the challenged action his injury
4
would not occur,' 4 the standard applied in tort cases on the merits, 5 or
the challenged action has
whether the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
46
substantially contributed to his alleged injury.
Policy arguments may be made for both the stricter and the more liberal
approach. The stricter test would eliminate any possibility that the court may
exceed its jurisdiction, and would guarantee cases in which issues are sharply
focused. 4 7 Furthermore the court and the defendant would avoid time-

circularity of the proximate cause/duty concepts of private law is equally applicable to
the circularity of standing considerations of injury, interest and cause. "The question
[was the defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against this particular risk?]
becomes particularly helpful in cases where the only issue is in reality one of whether
the defendant is under any duty to the plaintiff at all- which is to say, whether he
stands in any such relation to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized obligation
of conduct for his benefit. Or, reverting again to the starting point, whether the interests
of the plaintiff are entitled to legal protection at the defendant's hands against the invasion which has in fact occurred. Or, again reverting, whether the conduct is the 'proximate
cause' of the result. The circumlocution is unavoidable, since all of these questions are,
in reality, one and the same." Id. at 244-45. Cf. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 43 (2d ed.
1970): "Such an approach [the legal interest test] is demonstrably circular: if the plaintiff
is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is legally protected; if he is denied
standing, his interest is not legally protected."
41. In its analysis of the sufficiency of the injury some of the factors the court may
weigh include its concreteness, specificity, directness, magnitude, imminence, and whether
it is personal to the plaintiff. Obviously the more direct, concrete, specific and imminent,
the more likely it is that the court will find a cognizable injury in fact. See, e.g,. Evans v.
Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976); Rodos v. Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1975);
Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64 (Ist Cir. 1975); Kiser v. Johnson, 404 F. Supp. 879 (M.D.
Pa. 1975); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Of these qualities,
however, only the personal nature of the injury is presently an absolute requirement
for standing. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
42. Thus the "directness" and "imminence" of the injury can play double roles in a
standing decision, first in their effect on the court's characterization of the sufficiency
of the injury, see note 41 supra, and second in their effect on a court's decision as to how
clearly plaintiff will be required to demonstrate the causal relationship between act and
injury. See also note 92 infra.
43. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1927 (1976).
44. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. On the surface the question seems merely a technical pleadings question: what
degree of causal connection must be alleged and demonstrated prior to a hearing on the
merits in order to survive motions to dismiss, F. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or a motion for summary
judgment, F. R. Civ. P. 56? See Broderick, supra note 8, at 480-82, 508-09. A related
question is whether there is, or should be, any difference between the quantum of causal
showing necessary to grant standing and that required to state a claim for which relief
can be granted. See generally Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of Standing,
14 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962); and note 50 infra.
47. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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consuming, expensive litigation, and the court could shield itself from
controversies that it feels are more appropriate for resolution by other
branches of the federal or state governments- both strong prudential reasons
for imposing the higher threshold test.48
On the other hand, unlike tort cases, standing questions do not involve
the liability of a private defendant for the consequences of his actions, but
instead are concerned with the individual's right to obtain a judicial forum
to protect himself from injurious government action. 9 Since it is a threshold
determination,50 the standing causality test should not be as strict as that
which must be met on the merits. Instead the court should be satisfied with

48. These are the resource-allocation and decision-making aspects of standing discussed
in Scott, note 8, supra.
49. A tort cause of action is generally a private right of action for a wrong done to
private individuals; it is not primarily concerned, as is standing law, with the impact on
individuals of public actions or of private actions with a strong public interest element,
such as antitrust cases. See note 182 infra. Thus policy considerations are not parallel in
the two situations: if the public interest as a whole is high, or if acts of the government
are involved, society may very well benefit from permitting a far more attenuated causal
connection, in order to provide a forum for its citizens who wish to avoid governmental
injury. See WRIGHT & MiLtxR, supra note 8, §3531 at 180, who point out that it is hard
to understand why the courts would limit standing to injuries to legal rights "in light
of the greatly increased capacity of official action to cause injury and of the relatively
helpless predicament of an individual affected by an injurious government action." Private
actions, on the other hand, rest on policy considerations of establishing a standard of care
among private individuals. Thus, there is a strong interest in limiting liability to harm
that is reasonably foreseeable and an attenuated causal chain is less desirable. See PRossEP,
supra note 37, at 251.
50. Actually there is much confusion as to the "preliminary" nature of the standing
inquiry. The Court has tried to distinguish issues of standing and the merits, in theory
at least. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968): "The fundamental aspect of standing
is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and
not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated"; and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 176
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting): "[A]lleged injury in fact, reviewability,
and the merits pose questions that are largely distinct from one another, each governed
by its own considerations. To fail to isolate and treat each inquiry independently of
the other two, so far as possible, is to risk uninformed, poorly reasoned decisions that
may result in injustice." However, these principles are more often honored in the breach
than in the observance. See, e.g., National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass.,
414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974). Professor Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Actions:
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALt L.J. 425 (1974), points to the
similarities between the test for standing and the test for stating a claim for relief: both
involve questions of injury, duty, and violation. Id. at 428-29. It is Albert's thesis that
it is dangerous to ignore the interrelationships between the two inquiries, since principles
of policy are so clearly interrelated. Id. Perhaps the best way to look at the standing question is as part of a procedural continuum consisting of the following questions: 1) whether
a justiciable case or controversy exists; 2) whether plaintiff has standing; 3) whether the
controversy is sufficiently ripe, or moot; 4) whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief;
and 5) whether the court can grant any remedy. If courts frequently fail to make adequate
distinctions between these issues, it may be because they are not discrete areas of concern.
See WRIGnT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3529. Such confusion makes the case which does
succeed in sorting out these issues particularly valuable. See, e.g., Bergman v. Stein, 404 F.
Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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a demonstration of a reasonable possibility of a causal relationship.5 ' This
would be particularly helpful in areas of complex fact situations since it
would permit the court to reserve judgment on its jurisdiction 52 until after
the plaintiff has had an opportunity to avail himself of pretrial discovery. 53
Furthermore if the higher test is one of constitutional dimension, it must be
applied across the board, which would eliminate many plaintiffs otherwise
qualified to bring their suits.A second factor further complicates the court's attempt to apply neutral
principles in measuring the sufficiency of the injury and of the causal showing:
the relationship of the injury to the underlying statute or constitutional provision upon which plaintiff bases his claim. Following the Data Processing
test, federal courts have attempted to distinguish the injury in fact analysis
from the second, non-constitutional, prong of the test: that plaintiff's interests
are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee invoked. 55 As a result many courts, including the Burger Court, have attempted to apply the Data Processing
test, which was developed in a situation where a concrete economic injury
was alleged,56 to situations where the injury cannot properly be identified
5 7
apart from the claim upon which it is based.
51. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 530-31 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1972): "Sierra makes clear that the Court is retaining all of its decisions establishing a
'modernized law of standing' so as (a) to embrace injury in fact, suffered or anticipated,
to environmental . . . as well as economic interests; (b) to prohibit dismissal of a
litigation where there is an 'arguable' claim of injury .......
Id.
52. The ability of a court to reserve a standing decision until it hears the merits of a
case would seem to counter the concern of courts that they not violate their Article III
jurisdiction. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972), where the Court demonstrated its
reluctance to grant that discovery power without first determining standing.
54. If, on the other hand, the higher standard is to be applied only in selected
cases, it raises serious questions about the present Court's return to "judicial supremacy."
R. JAcKsON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, cited in Broderick, The Warth Optimal

Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy? 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467, 467 n.4 (1976).
55. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
56. Id. at 154.
57. The Supreme Court has recognized that "the actual or threatened injury required
by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing .
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), citing Linda R.S. v.
W..'
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). See also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). However, it has become increasingly clear that many noneconomic injuries cannot be properly identified, much less analyzed for their sufficiency,
without some reference to the sources upon which plaintiff bases his claim. See notes
154-156 and 195-208 infra and accompanying text.
Thus the Data Processing test, which seemed to open up standing where economic
injury was concerned, may have resulted in a stricter standard when courts attempt to
analyze a noneconomic injury. Since the plaintiffs in Data Processing asserted an economic
injury, the only issue in the case was whether this competitive injury gave them
sufficient status to assert a claim against the administrative action, a problem that the
second prong of the test addressed. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Although it might have
been difficult for the plaintiffs to prove the fact of their injury, this question was left
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Despite the contention that the causal showing requirement is part of
the constitutional case or controversy standing determination, the type of
showing required in actuality depends to a large extent on how clearly the
plaintiff's injury is related to an interest protected by an underlying statute
or constitutional guarantee. Thus the federal courts invariably mix constitutional and prudential considerations when they use an implicit "zone of
interests" test to determine what cause in fact and injury in fact tests they
will impose.58
POLICY CAUSE

Since analysis of injury, claim, and causation are part of the injury in
fact determination, most policy decisions to limit standing are made within
the constitutional standing framework. Even when a plaintiff alleges a
sufficient cause in fact relationship to meet whatever standard the court
imposes, a court may nevertheless determine that for policy reasons it will
not give the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant. 59 Although this
policy determination may be articulated through other doctrines, 60 it is often
stated as a finding that the plaintiff lacks standing. 61 As in tort cases, courts
62
will sometimes use causal language to explain this decision.
for the trial. Given the facts of the case, the Court required the least onerous showing
possible. Yet in later cases, when the injury was less palpable, courts have been forced
to analyze the components of the injury and its relationship to the challenged action
in much more detail. In this situation the injury in fact requirement, taken without the
zone of interests test, proves to be much harder to meet than Data Processingwould suggest.
For an interesting suggestion on how the zone of interests test can be effectively used to
vary the type of injury required, see Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative
Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213 (1975).
58. See notes 203-207 infra and accompanying text.
59. This is the case in the private antitrust area. See notes 181-182 infra and accompanying text.

60. These include the doctrines of justiciability, ripeness, mootness, political question
and finality. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3529 at 153; Broderick, note 54 supra.
While courts frequently use concepts of justiciability and standing interchangeably, some
courts, making particular efforts to distinguish between the purposes of the various
justiciability doctrines, may find that plaintiffs have standing yet dismiss the case on other
justiciability grounds. See, e.g., Kiser v. Johnson, 404 F. Supp. 879 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp (M.D.N.C.
1975).
61. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
Although the court specifically stated that it would not reach the political question
issue, but rather settle the case on standing doctrine, id. at 215, many of its arguments
reflect the policy issues relevant to the political question doctrine. Id. at 227.
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Pollack,
The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 691, 699 (1963). Similarly, tort cases sometimes speak in terms of causality
when analyzing a statutory violation, holding that the violation of the statute was not
the proximate cause of the injury: "In such a statement there is an obvious fallacy. In
all such cases the act of the defendant has clearly caused the damage. . . . What the
statute does, or does not do, is condition the legality of the act, and to qualify or characterize

it as negligent." PROSSER, supra note 37, at 193. Courts sometimes use the same misleading
causal language to deny standing. What they are actually doing is deciding whether
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An examination of the Supreme Court's position on attenuated causal
relationships under the Warren and Burger Courts well illustrates the complex
issues that arise when plaintiffs seek standing to complain of injuries caused
by remote governmental action.
RECENT CASES:

SCRAP, Laird, AND Linda R.S.

The question of how great an attenuation between cause and effect will
be permitted for standing purposes was partially answered by the Supreme
Court in 1973 in United States v. SCRAP.63 In SCRAP an environmental
group sought to enjoin enforcement of an ICC order allowing railroads to
collect a surcharge on freight rates pending the adoption of rate increases
until an environmental impact study was made under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).64 The plaintiffs alleged that the failure to
suspend the surcharge would cause their members economic, recreational,
and aesthetic harm, and that the new rate structure would discourage the
use of recyclable materials and promote the use of raw materials, causing an
adverse effect on the environment.65 They specifically claimed that the raised
rates would result in air and solid waste pollution in the parks they used in
Washington and in a possible diminution of the natural resources within
those parks.66 Although defendants claimed that it would be impossible for
plaintiffs to prove that such an injury would result,67 the Court granted
standing by applying the liberal test of Conley v. GibsonG8 that a complaint
should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief." 69 Recognizing the extremely attenuated line of causation70
plaintiff falls within the clas3 of persons to be protected by the statute - the familiar

"zone of interests" test. However, by speaking in causal terms, they appear to be talking
about

the

'causation'

constitutional dimension of standing. Furthermore, "[tireating 'injury' and
as if they presented merely factual questions, dealing solely with time
and

space without reference to values, can only serve to confuse analysis .....
Pollack, supra,
at 699.
63. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
64. 42 U.S.C. §4 342(2)(c) (1970). Plaintiffs claimed standing under §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
65. 412 U.S. at 675-76.
66. Id. at 678.
67. Brief for Appellant at 87, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Indeed
the appellees themselves acknowledged the difficulty of proof: "It

should be obvious to

all parties that S.C.R.A.P. has neither the finances nor the expertise to 'prove' that a
specific quantity of scrap in the Washington, D.C. area would have been recycled 'but
for' the latest I.C.C. railroad rate increase. Similarly, S.C.R.A.P. cannot 'prove' the amount
of additional pollution in the Washington, D.C. area created by the latest I.C.C. railroad
rate increase." Brief for Appellee on Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, at 25, United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 699 (1973).
68. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
69. Id. at 45-46. The degree of proof required for summary judgment could be higher.
See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689; but see Coalition for the Environment v.
Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 168 (8th Cir. 1974): "Indeed, despite the dicta concerning the
possibility of summary judgment on a standing question contained in [SCRAP], this Court
believes that such a disposition will be proper in only a very few and unique cases."
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the Court nevertheless could not be certain that the allegations were incapable of proof7 1 The minority Justices vehemently disagreed. Calling the
injuries "remote" and "speculative"7 2 they argued that such tenuous future
injury was insufficient to create a justiciable case or controversy.73
As in all standing cases turning on complex causal questions, the distinction between majority and minority opinions is easier to grasp when underlying policy questions are examined. As the minority Justices implied, 74
plaintiffs were a group of law students who were probably less interested
in preventing specific tin-can litter in their local park than in overcoming
the detrimental impact that higher freight rates might have on recycling
efforts nationwide.75 To the minority Justices the concrete injury alleged
seemed at most a spurious cover for litigating what was essentially a generalized
grievance7 6 An injury so characterized raises standing questions of both
constitutional and prudential dimensions: since no injury may ever occur
there is some question as to whether the court has the power to entertain
the suit, and, even assuming such power, whether it would be wise to exercise
7
it in this situation. 7
The majority, except for Justice Douglas,78 refused to confront the
policy and constitutional questions that the case raised concerning the speculative nature of the alleged injury or the attenuated causal relationship. Moreover the Court refused to base its holding on the specific qualities of the
See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1932 n.6 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
70. 412 U.S. at 688.
71. Id. at 689-90.
72. Id. at 723. (White, J., Burger, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 722-23. The dissenting justices criticized the majority for its willingness
"to suspend its judgment in the dim hope that proof at trial will in some unexplained
Id. at 723 (White, J., dissentway flesh them out and establish the necessary nexus .
ing).
74. Id. at 722-23.
75. See Comment, Standing to Challenge Governmental Actions Which Have an Insubstantial or Attenuated Effect on the Environment, 1974 DuKn L.J. 491.

76. The allegations are "in reality little different from the general-interest allegations
found insufficient and too remote in Sierra Club." 412 U.S. at 723 (White, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), where the Court's discussion of
generalized citizens' grievances seems to combine both constitutional and prudential aspects
of standing. Id. at 209-28. The Court refused to hear the cases partly because it claimed
that no specific injury in fact personal to the plaintiffs existed. Id. at 220. Justice Brennan
pointed out that Richardson had alleged such an injury, which the Court refused to
consider. See 418 U.S. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus the Court seems to be
ignoring the injury in fact rule, or at least looking behind alleged injuries to determine
whether they serve merely as pleading formalities masking cases it otherwise would not
hear.

78. Dissenting in part, Justice Douglas made a complicated analysis of the rate structure in an effort to show that there was indeed a dearly detrimental environmental
impact to be anticipated. 412 U.S. at 699-714. While he generally stands in favor of
eliminating standing requirements entirely, (see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (Douglas,
J., dissenting)) he seems prepared to go to the merits to prove a causal connection for
standing purposes when he feels it is necessary to offset a claim of tenuousness.
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underlying environmental statute (NEPA) that plaintiffs claimed defendants
had violated. 79 Instead the case turned on a procedural point: although
plaintiffs might have appropriately been required to make a stronger showing
of causality on a motion for summary judgment, they should not be forced
to show more on a motion to dismiss.80 It may be said, as defendants argued,"'
that SCRAP stands for a negative cause in fact rule, namely that the defendant must prove there is no causal connection. At least on a motion to
dismiss, any showing of a potential tie between the challenged act and the
alleged future injury is sufficient for injury in fact purposes, even if it depends
on inference and even if it is equally possible that plaintiff's success on the
merits will not prevent the alleged detrimental impact.8 2 While SCRAP took
a very liberal approach toward the necessary causal showing, the lack of a
more principled basis for its decision left the question open for future courts
to consider.
Other Supreme Court decisions of the same period indicated that some
situations would warrant a closer scrutiny of the causal nexus than was
made in SCRAP. In Laird v. Tatum,83 handed down a year before SCRAP,
the Court refused to grant standing to plaintiffs who complained that the
existence of an extensive Army surveillance system caused them present
injury by chilling their first amendment rights. 8 4 Holding that the allegations
of a subjective chill were not "an adequate substitute for a claim of specific
present objective harm or threat of specific future harm,"8 5 the Court ex79. See text accompanying notes 186-195 infra. It is possible that given its liberal position toward standing the majority preferred to make the holding on attenuation broader
than it would have been had the decision rested on the basis of the statute involved.
The result is that federal courts have been able to apply the SCRAP holding to a variety
of non-NEPA cases. See, e.g.. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889
(D.D.C. 1974); Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F. Supp. 488 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. 412 U.S. at 689. In a footnote the Court suggests that any lack of "precision" in
the allegations could have been corrected through a motion for a more precise statement
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Id. at 689 n.15. Furthermore, defendants should have moved
in the district court for more evidence on the standing issue. Id.
81. See Brief for Appellant, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), saying
that even if the burden of proof were on the railroads to disprove SCRAP's standing,
"there would be no way to meet allegations of this kind since there are virtually no
specifics provided." Id. at 85.
82. See 412 U.S. at 724 (White, J., dissenting): "I add only that failure to maintain
this country's railroads even in their present anemic condition will guarantee that recyclable materials will stay where they are-far beyond the reach of recycling plants
that as a consequence may not be built at all."
83. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
84. Id. at 10. Both the Supreme Court and the appellate court emphasized that
plaintiffs were not complaining about any "specific action" of the Army against them,
but the mere existence of the system itself. Id. at 3, citing Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 953
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. 408 U.S. at 13-14. The indirectness of the injury was not a problem. Id. at 12-13.
However, the Court found that the case differed from other chilling effect cases in that
here the challenged action was not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature."
Id. at 11. Instead plaintiffs' chilling effect arose merely from the knowledge that the
activity was occurring. Id. The dissent, however, agreed with the lower court that the
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pressed skepticism about the causal nexus by noting that the plaintiffs had
"left somewhat unclear the precise connection between the mere existence of
the challenged system and their own alleged chill... ."86 The majority implied
that plaintiffs' allegations of a chill were a pretext for seeking disclosure of
the Army's activities through a judicial forum,8s and indicated that the court
should not act as "monitors" of executive action.88
A similar result was reached in O'Shea v. Littleton,9 in which the Court

refused to permit a group of plaintiffs to challenge the allegedly discriminatory administration of their county criminal justice system. Here
none of the plaintiffs had alleged specific past injuries, and the Court
found that any future injuries were too remote since they were contingent
on the double possibility that plaintiffs would act illegally and that the
state would arrest and prosecute them.9 0 This decision put access to a forum
beyond plaintiffs' reach since they could not allege an intent to act illegally.91
Both Laird and O'Shea demonstrate that causal problems may be different
where the injury is only threatened and there is no underlying protective
statute expressing congressional intent to protect against such future injury.
In such a situation a court's insistence that plaintiffs demonstrate a fairly
strong likelihood that the injury will occur may be constitutionally mandated,
since without such an injury there would be no case or controversy. 92 Laird
Army surveillance "exercises a present inhibiting effect on their . . . First Amendment
rights." Id. at 25, (Douglas, J., dissenting), citing Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d at 954.
86. 408 U.S. at 13 n.7. The Court also found that plaintiffs had "cast considerable
doubt on whether they themselves are in fact suffering from any chill . . .Even assuming
a justiciable controversy, if respondents themselves are not chilled, but seek only to
represent those 'millions' whom they believe are so chilled, respondents clearly lack that
'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' essential to standing." Id.
87. What respondents "appear to be seeking is a broad-scale investigation, conducted
by themselves as private parties armed with the subpoena power of a federal district
court and the power of cross-examination, to probe into the Army's intelligence-gathering
activities, with the district court determining at the conclusion of that investigation the
extent to which those activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission."
id. at 14.

88. 408 U.S. at 15. "Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal
courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action ...

." Id.

89. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
90. Id. at 497-98.
91. Id. at 498.
92. The dissenting justices in Laird, however, recognized that "one need not wait
to sue until his reputation is defamed." 408 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) (Douglas, J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting). When the causal issue is one of "imminence," that is, of whether the
injury may occur at all-as it is in SCRAP and O'Shea-policy considerations may be
different from those that arise when an injury is alleged to be present but the causal
claim is attenuated. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The question of "imminence,"
which focuses on a future rather than an existing injury, comprises the most difficult
aspect of injury in fact analysis, since the plaintiff must prove to some undefined degree
the probability of the injury as well as its causal connection to the challenged action.
Most courts, however, do not distinguish between the two issues and tend to treat
both questions, admittedly closely related, in the same standing terms. This is true in
SCRAP, Laird and O'Shea.
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and O'Shea may be further distinguished from SCRAP in that plaintiffs could
not show tangible, concrete injury to individuals; thus to grant relief the
court would need to monitor the overall systems that the plaintiffs were
challenging - in one case the Army,93 in the other a state court.9 4 Clearly
the Court's reluctance to assume this role contributed to its finding of no
injury in fact.
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.9 5 was the most important Warren Court case
to deny standing squarely on the grounds of an insufficient causal nexus.
In Linda R.S. an unwed mother sought to enjoin the discriminatory application of a Texas criminal child support statute to parents of legitimate
children only, claiming that the district attorney unconstitutionally discriminated against her illegitimate children by refusing to prosecute their
father for failure to provide child support.9 6 The Court held that since the
child support statute provided solely for criminal sanctions, the "only result"
of success on the merits would be to send the father to jailY The Court
recognized the inference that a judicial declaration could result in future
payments of child support but called it "speculative." 98 Since the " 'direct'
relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated
which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of standing is
absent,"'9 9 there was an insufficient nexus between the plaintiff's injury and
the government action she attacked.
The Court's requirement that an injury be directly caused by the
challenged act seems to go against the flow of post-Data Processing case law. 100
The Court's basis for a denial of standing on the ground that ultimate relief
is speculative also seems questionable. Had the plaintiff produced an affidavit
demonstrating the father's intent to pay support if the plaintiff were to
prevail on the merits, it is still doubtful that the Court would have enThe difference between directness and imminence is primarily one of emphasis: an

imminence investigation looks first at the challenged act to see what, if any, chain of
causation it can follow to the plaintiff. The directness inquiry looks first at the plaintiff
and his injury, and then tries to follow a chain backwards to the challenged action. A
potential breakdown in the chain when the question is the imminence of the injury
is a more severe barrier to standing that when it is directness, since such a breakdown
would suggest that no injury at all may occur, and thus that the case is not suitable
for judicial consideration. With the directness question, a potential breakdown should
be less important at the threshold level since an injury has already occurred and a
causal question can be settled on the merits.
93. See notes 87-88 supra.
94. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 498 (1974).
95. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
96. Id. at 614-15. The Texas courts had construed the statute to apply to parents
of legitimate children only. Id. at 615.
97. The court noted that unlike civil contempt statutes, under which a defendant
would be freed "on compliance with his legal obligations," the statute in question imposed
a fixed penalty on offenders. Id. at 618.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Linda, the Court returned
to Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) to find support for its "directness"
requirement. 410 U.S. at 614.
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tertained the suit. The real reason for denying standing seems not to have
been the failure of a cause in fact relationship but a policy cause decision
that interested or even injured citizens should not be permitted to interfere
in prosecutorial decisions. 101 Unfortunately, by basing its rationale on the
plaintiff's actual prospects of relief, 0 2 the Court introduced a new concept
into the law of standing which was to be developed by the Burger Court
into a tool for denying standing where there were weaker policy reasons
for avoiding a decision on the merits.
Warth, Simon AND

ThE NEw CAUSALiTY

Warth v. Seldin
Both Lairdand Linda R.S. represent limitations on the SCRAP attenuatedcause standard. However, it was Warth v. Seldinos that directly repudiated
the possibility of applying the lenient SCRAP test in constitutional standing
cases. In Warth a group of low-income plaintiffs, among others,'- alleged
05
that they were unable to locate low-cost housing in the town of Penfield'
and that the town's restrictive zoning ordinances had made it impossible
for such housing to be built. They further alleged that such an exclusion
101. The Court specifically based its holding on the underlying policy issue, emphasizing that "in the unique context of a challenge to a criminal statute" there was
an insufficient nexus "to justify judicial intervention," 410 U.S. at 617-18, and further
pointed out that "a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution." Id.
at 619. However, later courts have treated the holding on directness as a general rule
to be applied apart from the special circumstances of the case. See Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1927 (1976). Wright has criticized this foundation
for the holding, saying that although there is "strong justification for denying standing
in the area of a private citizen's relationship to the enforcement of criminal sanctions,"
here standing was denied with the "surprising assertion that there was no adequate claim
that the lack of support merely was a direct injury resulting from the failure to prosecute."
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, §3531 at 229.
102. Whether this rationale is based on the constitutional ground that no case or
controversy exists if relief cannot be guaranteed, or on prudential ground of limiting
judicial resources is unclear. In any case this writer would contend that treating these
considerations in standing language is misleading since the issue really goes to failure to
state a claim for relief or to the overall case or controversy rule that the court will not
give advisory opinions (see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)), and not to
the issue of whether an injury in fact exists. The only way that the measure of relief
relates to standing is that it might be used as an indicium, as the court may be doing in
Warth, of whether the challenged action caused the plaintiff's injury. However, the
better approach would be to grant the plaintiff standing if the action in any way contributes to the plaintiff's injury.
103. 422 US. 490 (1975).
104. The court also denied standing to other plaintiffs, including a not-for-profit
corporation interested in alleviating housing shortages of low- and moderate-income persons in the Rochester area, several individual Rochester taxpayers, a home builders association, and an umbrella corporation consisting of several organizations interested in housing
problems. Id. at 491.
105. Each low-income plaintiff specifically alleged that he had sought housing in
Penfield. rd. at 503 n.13-14, and 506 n.16.
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violated their constitutional right to travel and contravened the civil rights
statutes. 10
The court attacked the sufficiency of the low-income plaintiffs' causal
allegations:
We may assume, as petitioners allege, that respondents' actions
have contributed, perhaps substantially, to the cost of housing in
Penfield. But there remains the question whether petitioners' inability
to locate suitable housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to have
resulted, in any concretely demonstrable way,
from respondents'
1
alleged constitutional and statutory infractions. 07
Although the court was willing to concede arguendo that there was a cause
in fact relationship between the challenged action and housing costs in
Penfield""' this nexus was insufficient. Instead petitioners had to satisfy a
rather stringent "but for"'01 9 test, showing not just a loss of opportunity, but
a loss of specific housing. 10 Similarly, they had to demonstrate that an
equally concrete future benefit would flow from the adjudication.
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred
that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a
substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase
or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested,
the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed."'
Although the Court agreed that the injury need not be direct, the fact of
indirectness made it more difficult to meet the minimal constitutional causal
showing that "in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm."" 12
On the other hand, as the dissent pointed out, plaintiffs had clearly
alleged that because of the exclusionary zoning ordinance, they had been
unable to find a home in Penfield."' Rather than accept this allegation on
its face, the Court scrutinized the supporting affidavits" 14 and then- without
106. Plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion contravened their 1st, 9th and 14th amendment rights, and violated 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982 and 1983 (1970).
107. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. See notes 38 and 67 supra and accompanying text. Surely it is possible from the
face of the pleadings and the supporting affidavits to find a material issue of fact
as to whether the zoning practices in question could have been a substantial factor in
plaintiff's inability to find housing, particularly since the court is willing to assume a
causal relationship between zoning and housing costs. See note 51 supra.
110. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Standing to Sue in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited, 54 N. CAR. L. REv. 449 (1976); see also note 130 infra.
111. 422 U.S. at 504.
112. Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973).
113. 422 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also points out that if
plaintiffs manage to prove that their injuries are causally connected to the zoning practices,
they will have the requisite personal stake - the outcome required to meet constitutional
criteria for standing. I'd. at 524-25.
114. Id. at 501-02.
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benefit of an adversary hearing -gave its own causal explanation: plaintiff's
"inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the
115
area housing market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts."
Warth's strict causality test seems to go much farther than previous Court
decisions in the type of showing necessary to meet constitutional standing re7
quirements."1 6 Judged by the liberal standards of Flast v. Cohen"1 and
8
Conley v. Gibson,"1 plaintiffs had made a sufficient allegation of a causal
nexus to survive a motion to dismiss. Their failure to produce a concrete
project in which they had an interest could be taken as further proof of
9
the success of the exclusionary zoning practices they challenged."- Furthermore, the only significant intervening factor-the desire and ability of
builders to erect suitable low-cost housing-was apparently accounted for
in the case since area builders were also joined as plaintiffs. 20 Indeed, as
the minority opinion pointed out, the true weakness of Warth is that it treated
without
each plaintiff group as a separate unit, denying standing to each
21
considering the causal interrelationships of their various claims.'
Equally questionable is the Court's application of the rule that plaintiffs
must prove that they "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
courts' intervention.'1 22 While this principle reflects the constitutional
standing requirement that the plaintiff have a "direct personal stake in the
outcome,"' 123 rarely has the Court required the type of specific showing that
Warth demands-that plaintiffs have a future stake in a particular project.
For instance, in James v. Valtierra,"2s another exclusionary case, plaintiffs
challenging a California law that required a public referendum prior to
the establishment of any low-cost housing were not required to show exactly
how the removal of the rule would affect their personal housing needs. 25
Although clothed as a constitutional decision that an insufficient injury
in fact existed, Warth seems to be based on a prudential determination by
the Court to impose higher injury in fact standards where constitutional
115. Id. at 506.
116. See cases cited at note 125 infra and accompanying text.
117. 393 U.S. 83 (1968).
118. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
119. See note 131 infra.
120. 422 U.S. at 514. The association, which represented member firms engaged in the
development and construction of housing in the Penfield area, alleged that the challenged
zoning practices had deprived some of its members of "substantial business opportunities
and profits" and asked for damages and equitable relief. The court dismissed the petition
for damages on the grounds that the association alleged no monetary injury to itself,
and lacked standing to claim such injury on the behalf of its individual members. Id. at
515. Its prayer for prospective relief was also dismissed for failure to refer to any
specific projects currently precluded by the challenged action. Id. at 516.
121. Id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 508.
123. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
124. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
125. Nor was more required of plaintiffs in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) or Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 49, 189 (1975).
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rights are being adjudicated.126 There may be stronger policy reasons for
requiring a greater causal showing in such cases since the Court is not dealing
with statutory interpretation but with constitutional principle. 12 7 If this is
indeed the reason for the higher standard, the Court should so state, making
it clear that the Warth test is appropriate only in special constitutional
cases. 128 Furthermore, it should weigh the factors militating against adjudication' 29 against those which would favor standing in such cases, in particular,
the plaintiff's difficulty in proving causation without an adequate opportunity
to present his case, and the significant problem of obtaining standing in
"lost opportunity" cases, l3 1 in which the success of the allegedly violative acts
126. Cf. WRImHT & MILLER, supra note 8, §3531 at 18 (Supp. 1975): "It remains
to be seen whether [Warth] will be generalized into a broader authorization to rely on
standing doctrine to avoid resolution of sensitive constitutional issues." Id. Professor
Davis dislikes the "notion that the law of standing can keep judges from assuming too
much governmental power, that it can limit courts to appropriate subject matter, that
it can help assure competent presentation of cases, and above all, that it can protect
against a flood of litigation .... ." and argues that the "law of standing is the wrong
tool to accomplish [these] judicial objectives .
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 469 (1970).
127. See Scott, Standing to Sue in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REv. 645, 656-57 (1973).
128. This is the dissenting Justices' opinion of the policy factors behind the case:
"[T]he opinion, which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who
could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only
by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits. I can appreciate the court's reluctance to adjudicate the complex and difficult legal questions involved in determining
the constitutionality of practices which assertedly limit residence in a particular municipality
to those who are white and relatively well-off, and I also understand that the merits of
this case could involve grave sociological and political ramifications. But courts cannot
refuse to hear a case on the merits merely because they would prefer not to, and it is
quite clear, when the record is viewed with dispassion, that at least three of the groups
of plaintiffs have made allegations, and supported them with affidavits and documentary
evidence, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing." 422 U.S. at 520-21
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Such factors might include (1) a reluctance to become entangled with complex
social, political and economic issues, see note 128 supra; (2) a desire not to interfere in
areas traditionally left to state control, see 422 U.S. at 508 n.18; and (3) a fear of
opening the "floodgates" of litigation. Although the "floodgate" argument is frequently
cited as a reason for denying standing, Professor Scott has suggested that the court has
exaggerated the dimensions of the problem. "When the 'floodgates' of litigation are
opened to some new class of controversy by a decision, it is notable how rarely one can
discern the flood that the dissenters feared. The plaintiff (or the organization actually
funding and conducting the litigation, if legal rules force the use of nominal plaintiffs)
must feel strongly enough about the issue in question to pay the bills, and that both
cuts down the flood and gives us at least a partial measure of his 'stake' in the outcome."
Scott, supra note 127, at 673-74.
130. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, §3531 at 18 (Supp. 1975): "It is difficult to
know how far this decision will influence the future development of standing doctrine.
There may be an increased emphasis on detailed pleading of the facts claimed to constitute
injury in fact, but pleading latitude probably will depend on the nature of the injury
asserted. The injury of exclusion is susceptible to much more elaborate factual inquiry,
and thus pleading requirements, than-for instance-such injuries as are commonly
alleged by users of a potentially injured environment. More fundamentally, the opinion
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denies plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain the concrete interest necessary for
standing.'31 By basing its rationale on the issue of causality alone, the Court
distorts the truly complex standing problem that Warth represents.
Simon v. EasternKentucky Welfare Rights Organization
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization32 extended the
application of the causal nexus test from constitutional to general statutory
standing cases. Like United States v. SCRAP, ss Eastern Kentucky was an
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)34 case in which plaintiffs based their
claim on an interest allegedly created and protected by an underlying
congressional statute, here the Internal Revenue Service Code. 35 Several low
income individuals and organizations representing such individuals 36 brought
a class action against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, claiming that the IRS had violated the Internal Revenue
Code and the APA "by issuing a Revenue Ruling137 allowing favorable tax
treatment to a nonprofit hospital that offered only emergency room services
to indigents."'3 8 An earlier ruling had required a nonprofit hospital to be
operated "to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for
the services rendered" to claim these favorable tax benefits as a charitable
organization. 13 9
The substance of plaintiffs' claim was that the IRS change in policy
encouraged hospitals to deny services to indigents, thereby injuring their
"opportunity and ability" to receive services in nonprofit hospitals receiving
benefits under the Code.14° They further alleged that individual plaintiffs
had been denied services because of their indigency by hospitals claiming
reflects a determination that the constitution does not protect against simple impairment
of the opportunity to look for housing, but protects only against interference with quite
specific projects of identified builders and intending occupants. In such terms, it may
be wondered whether the Court demanded too much." Id.
131. Similar problems of exclusionary tactics which by their very success denied access
to the judicial system arose in the "white primary" cases of the forties and fifties, when
Democratic Party groups in the South excluded Negroes from pre-general election selection
process, claiming that such an exclusion did not constitute state action. Looking at substance over form, the Court held that the exclusion was unconstitutional state discrimination. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
132. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
133. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
134. 5 U.S.C. §6702 (1970).
135. 96 S. Ct. at 1922, 1924.
136. Id. at 1921.
137. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 117.
138. 96 S. Ct. at 1920. The new Ruling did not explicitly extend this treatment to
all non-profit hospitals; instead it described two unidentified hospitals, and held that
one would qualify for charitable status despite its failure to meet more restrictive IRS
requirements which had previously been in force. A second hospital, "which differed
significantly in both corporate structure and operating policies," was still refused this
status. 96 S. Ct. at 1920-21.
139. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 202.
140. 96 S. Ct. at 1922.
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the charitable exemption. 14 To bring themselves within the second prong
of the Data Processing test they also alleged that they were among the
intended beneficiaries of the Code section granting favorable tax treatment
to charitable organizations.142

Writing for the majority, Justice Powell found that plaintiffs failed to
allege facts sufficient to support a finding that they had suffered an injury
in fact. As in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.13 and Warth v. Seldin,144 the Court
focused on the plaintiffs' prospects for relief, restating the test as whether
"the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision." 1 45 The Court then applied the two-pronged test it

had used in Warth, analyzing first the causal relationship between the injury
and the challenged action,46 and next the relationship between the provision
of a forum and alleviation of the injury.1 4 7 The complaint failed to meet
either prong because it relied on speculation to flesh out its causal claims.
[I]t does not follow from the allegation [that the adoption of the Ruling
encouraged hospitals tco deny services] . . . that the denial of access

to hospital services in fact results from petitioners' new Ruling, or
that a court-ordered return by petitioners to their previous policies
would result in these respondents' receiving the hospital services they
desire. It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified
in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' "encouragement"
or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard
to the tax implications.1s

Although the Court recognized that the allegations that the hospitals receive
heavy donations supported an inference that hospitals would admit plaintiffs
if the new ruling were invalidated,149 it held such an inference impermissible
141. Id. at 1921-22.
142. Id. at 1922. Plaintiffs claimed that the word "charitable" in the Code had been
established by legislative history, IRS regulations and judicial precedent to mean "relief
of the poor." Id.

143.
144.

410 U.S. 614 (1973).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).

145. 96 S. Ct. at 1924. The Court even read its "redressability" test into the Data
Processing holding, saying that "[r]eduction of the threshold requirement to actual injury
redressable by the court represented a substantial broadening of access to the federal
courts over that previously thought to be the constitutional minimum under [the APA]."
Id.
146. Although the court recognized that plaintiffs had been injured in their interest
in obtaining hospital services, id. at 1925, since no hospital was a defendant, this was
insufficient injury unless it "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" rather than
to "the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. at 1925-26.
147. Obviously the second half of the test is a key determinant in the finding of
no standing. Thus while the Court held that the possibility of relief was an "implicit
corollary" of an allegation of injury caused by the challenged action, id. at 1926, the
test actually appears to add a dimension to the type of causal showing required for

standing.
148. Id.
149. This contention, made by plaintiffs, countered the Court's argument that if
plaintiffs won on the merits hospitals might nevertheless decide not to take the favorable
tax treatment. Id.
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when the injury is indirect. 150 Thus, unless plaintiffs are able to allege
sufficient facts to show a completed causal chain from the Ruling to the
denial of services, and from the invalidation of the Ruling to the provision
of those services, they may not ask the court to consider the merits of their
claim.
The Court's definition of the constitutional standing test as "actual
injury redressable by the court"'151 is not in itself objectionable, since it
properly focuses on the central question of standing, i.e., whether plaintiff
possesses a personal stake in the outcome.' 5 2 Here as in Warth the difficulty
lies in the type of showing that the Court requires to meet this test. It is
not enough that plaintiffs allege that the challenged action contributes to
their injury. They must demonstrate that "but for" the challenged action
they would not be so injured. While this is an appropriate test for identifying
cause in fact on the merits, such a high standard seems unnecessary for
standing purposes. 5 3 It is questionable whether many federal plaintiffs
would be able to account for the hundreds of contingencies that might
occur between a decision on the merits and the eventual mitigation of their
injury154 The imposition of such a high standard may foreclose many
plaintiffs from obtaining a forum to protect against injurious government
action despite the possibility that an adequate case or controversy actually
exists.
The fundamental question in Eastern Kentucky, as in Warth, is this:
when should plaintiffs be permitted to challenge governmental acts that
allegedly infringe an interest in obtaining benefits that may be constitutionally
or statutorily protected? In Eastern Kentucky plaintiffs claimed to be
beneficiaries under the IRS exemption for charitable organizations. By
focusing on the injury in fact test without explicit regard for the congressional scheme under which plaintiffs claimed their interest, the Court
failed to identify the injury as plaintiffs and the dissenting Justices do:
namely, injury to their opportunity and ability to obtain hospital services,

150. Id. at 1927. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975). However, the
Court did not succeed in distinguishing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), under
the rule, for surely the SCRAP facts required at least as much speculation to complete the
causal chain as the present facts do. The Court merely stated that while the injury was
indirect in SCRAP, "the complaint nevertheless 'alleged a specific and perceptible harm'
flowing from the agency action." 96 S.Ct. at 1927 n.25, citing United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. at 689. The Court also pointed out that the complaint might not have survived
a motion to dismiss. 96 S. Ct. at 1927 n.25.
151. 96 5. Ct. at 1924.
152. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
153. See notes 49-54 supraand accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The Court suggested
that the holdings in both cases were consistent with the test since in both cases the
injurious act would have been illegal were it not for the challenged regulations. However,
in neither of these cases were plaintiffs required to show that absent the challenged action
their ultimate economic situations would in fact be altered.
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155
Had the Court weighed
which is at least arguably protected by the statute.
the components of the plaintiffs' claim of right in determining the nature
of the injury it might have reached a different result, even applying the
stricter "but for" test, since plaintiffs could probably demonstrate that this
156
Had it not found an intent to
interest was injured by the new ruling.
protect plaintiffs, at least it would have grounded its holding on the proper
prudential zone of interests test.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Eastern Kentucky is that it demonstrates that the Court will not limit the higher causal showing test to
constitutional standing cases, where there may be particularly strong policy
reasons for restricting standing to situations where the issues are sharply
focused. 1 7 The application of the same test to plaintiffs claiming an interest,
58
that the
albeit indirect, under a statute suggests, as the dissent points out,
standing
deny
to
standard
higher
use
this
the
future
in
may
federal courts
in other types of statutory cases, and that Congress will be unable to "supply

155. This was essentially the position taken by Justice Brennan in an opinion concurring in the result only. Justice Brennan would have denied standing on ripeness
grounds because respondents failed to demonstrate "that the hospitals whose conduct
affected them were hospitals whose operations could fairly be characterized as implicated
by the terms of the ruling," 96 S. Ct. at 1931 (Brennan, J., dissenting), or that "the
tax-exempt status of the hospitals was in any way related to the ruling." Id. at 1932. However, Justice Brennan was alarmed both by the Court's "selectively imposed pleading requirement," id. at 1932 n.6, and by the Court's refusal to properly identify the injury
in fact. The proper injury (which is not an illegal denial of hospital services) can only
be identified in terms of plaintiff's claim of right: "[I]f respondents have a claim cognizable
under the law, it is that the Internal Revenue Code requires the government to offer
economic inducements to the relevant hospitals only under conditions which are likely
to benefit respondents. The relevant injury in light of this claim is, then, injury to
this beneficial interest- as respondents alleged, injury to their 'opportunit) and ability'
Nothing in the logic or policy of constitutionally required
to receive medical services ....
standing is added by the further injury in fact dimension required by the Court today
Id. at 1932-33. See also Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976).
156. The district court also failed to measure the plaintiff's claim when deciding that
sufficient injury existed, but seemed satisfied that a deprivation of medical care was the
correct injury in fact. Recognizing the problems inherent in proving a direct causal
nexus, the court noted that "iron clad documentation of a nexus between their tragic
situation and hospital behavior towards indigents, as affected by the new Ruling, has
not been, and, in all probability, cannot be provided to the satisfaction of the criteria
urged by the government." Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325,
330 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506
F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, the court felt that: "[Ijn light of the crucial significance
with which hospitals regard their status as charities, the court does not consider itself
engaged in wild speculation by assuming or recognizing that the relaxation of the
requirement for charitable classification would necessarily effect [sic] hospital policy, in
this case care for indigents, upon which such a status had been earlier dependent." Id.
The court found the "correlation" between act and injury "at least as demonstrable" as
that in SCRAP. Id.
157. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
158. 96 S. Ct. at 1936-37. "We may properly wonder where the Court, armed with
its 'fatally speculative pleadings' tool, will strike next." Id. at 1936.
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injured individuals with the means to make the factual showing in a specific
' 159
context that the Court today requires.'
CAUSALITY IN THE LowER FEDERAL CouRTs

Although it is not yet clear what effect the Warth and Eastern Kentucky
decisions will have on standing in the lower federal courts, some direction
is beginning to emerge. Lower court cases reveal the same tension between
the approaches of SCRAP and Warth that were apparent at the Supreme
Court level. Some cases follow SCRAP in permitting almost any causal
allegation to suffice without clear theoretical support for the decision. 160
Other cases are beginning to use the Warth pleadings test to support findings
of insufficient injury in fact.' 6 ' Fortunately the very number of cases in
which the lower federal courts must make standing decisions gives them an
advantage over the Supreme Court in that rules of standing evolve in a
more orderly and meaningful way. 6 2 The piecemeal approach that the
Supreme Court is forced to take in developing standing theory through
such disparate vehicles as SCRAP (a statutory standing case with a liberal
underlying statute) and Warth (a constitutional case involving state action)
often prohibits this kind of coherent overview.
In general, the lower courts seem to be applying a causal test falling
somewhere between SCRAP and Warth. Under this test some causal relationship must appear on the face of the complaint.' 63 However, if the nexus
is questionable or attenuated, courts will still sometimes strain to permit
standing when any of the following factors is present: (1) a specific injury; 64
(2) the allegation of a fundamental interest; 165 (3) the existence of a protective statute;' 66 (4) a request for relief which would involve minimal court
159. Id. at 1937. "of course the most disturbing aspect of today's opinion is the
Court's insistence on resting its decision regarding standing squarely on the irreducible
Art. III minimum of injury in fact, thereby effectively placing its holding beyond congressional power to rectify. Thus, any time Congress chooses to legislate in favor of
certain interests by setting up a scheme of incentives for third parties, judicial review of
administrative action that allegedly frustrates the congressionally intended objective will
be denied, because any complainant will be required to make an almost impossible showing."
Id. at 1936-37.
160. See, e.g., Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
court granted standing to nursing home administrators challenging an HEW regulation
on the ground that it had caused them a loss of public respect: "If these be thought
gossamer distinctions, we can only rejoin that SCRAP's ingenious law students have caused
us to be translated to ethereal realms, where we must function as best we are able." Id.
at 495.
161. See Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976); Metcalf v. National Petroleum
Council, 407 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1976).
162. See Eisenberg, Congressional Restrictions on Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,
83 YALE L.J. 498, 510-11 (1975).
163. See, e.g., Rodos v. Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1975); Independent Bankers
Ass'n of America v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975).
164. See, e.g., Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
165. See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974);
see also notes 226-228 infra and accompanying text.
166. See the discussion of NEPA cases accompanying notes 186-195 infra.
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interference;167 (5) an alleged causal connection that would be difficult to
prove prior to trial;168 and (6) a strong public policy favoring the grant of
a forum. 6 9 The presence of several of these factors may tip the scales
in favor of standing despite an attenuated causal chain. Certainly the most
important is the presence or absence of a statute or constitutional provision
that specifically protects against the type of injury the plaintiff is asserting.
Therefore the analysis of lower federal court opinions which follows will
emphasize the different causal treatments made in cases relying on express
statutory grants of standing, those founded upon general statutory review
provisions, and those based on a constitutional claim of right.
Express Statutory Review
Courts generally follow SCRAP's relaxed causal showing rule where there
has been an express Congressional grant of a right of action or a right to
review of administrative actions. Such Congressional authorization of the
exercise of judicial power resolves the separation of powers issue that
partially underlies the standing doctrine.1 70 A court must still have adversary
parties before it to have a case or controversy; however, recent holdings
emphasize that mere violation of a statute creating interests in the plaintiff
creates sufficient injury in fact, thus satisfying the minimal constitutional
requirement.17' As some lower federal courts have recognized, the standing
question cannot be resolved until the merits are decided since an injury
7 2
in fact will not exist unless there is a violation of the statuteY.
In

White v. Arlen Realty and Development Corp. 73 a consumer was

granted
properly
Lending
plaintiff

standing to bring an action
identifying goods bought on
Act,17 4 despite undisputed
had not in fact been misled by

against a department store for imcredit, in violation of the Truth in
allegations by defendant that the
the violationY 5 Although the district

7
76
the Fourth Circuit, citing Linda R.S., '
court found no injury in fact,'

held that the Act's disclosure requirements created a statutory right in the
creditor to have specific information, and the violation of that right made
167. See note 195 infra.
168. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975).
169. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 330 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev'd. on other grounds, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). See also note 156 supra.
170. See Scott, supra note 127, at 656-57; Note, Standing, Separation of Powers and
the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 835, 876 (1975).
171. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973); but see Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976).
172. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
173. 540 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1975, modified, 1976).
174. 15 U.S.C. §1637(b)(2) (1970).
175. See 540 F.2d at 648, 650.
176. 374 F. Supp. 151 (D. Md. 1974). The court found that plaintiff "faced no actual
or threatened injury as a result of defendant's billing practice" since plaintiff did not allege
or prove that he needed the information that defendant failed to provide. Id. at 158.
177. 540 F.2d at 649.
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him sufficiently aggrieved."78 Similar results have been reached under the
Freedom of Information Act, as courts have also generally dispensed with
the need to show detriment flowing from the refusal to supply requested information. 17 If a plaintiff can bring himself within the protected class of
such a statute the court may dispense with the question of injury in fact and
causal proof entirely. In some areas, however, higher causal showing requirements have been specifically imposed for policy reasons on otherwise
broad statutory standing grants. In private antitrust actions brought under
the Clayton Act,180 the lower federal courts have strictly limited standing,
despite broad statutory language, 81 to those plaintiffs who can meet both
82
strict cause in fact and strict policy cause requirements.
GeneralStatutory Review
The SCRAP[Warth tension is strongest in the area of general statutory
review. Plaintiffs who claim standing under general statutory standing grants
such as section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act 8 3 have met with
varying success when there is an attenuated causal nexus. They are most
successful when they are able to invoke a statute which dearly protects
against the kind of injury they complain of, even if it does not give them
an explicit right to review. Such a statute indicates a congressional judg178. "[C]ongress gave the debtor a right to specific information and therefore defined
'injury in fact' as the failure to disclose such information." Id. See also Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
179. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (when access is denied
a controversy exists and injury must be presumed); Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 523, 525
(7th Cir. 1968).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 14 (1970).
181. Under the Clayton Act, any person can file suit provided that he is "injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C.

§15 (1970).
182. See In re Mfultidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125-30
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.,
193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Beane, Anti-trust: Standing
and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. RyV. 331, 331-40 (1974); Note, Standing to Sue for Treble
Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUm. L. RV. 570, 571 (1964). Because
of the perceived policy needs of avoiding strike suits and limiting the extent of consequential damages from antitrust violations, courts have construed the standing requirement under the Clayton Act strictly. See note 181 supra. The vehicle for this stricter construction has been the statute's causal language. A plaintiff is required to show that he
stands in a certain relationship to the alleged conspirator before he can claim that he has
been injured "by reason of" anything forbidden by the antitrust laws. Clearly the question
is not one of cause in fact, but of policy cause. Nevertheless it should be noted that
in a post-Warth case the Sixth Circuit recently refused to apply the strict antitrust
causality test. In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), despite
defendant's contention that its act was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury,
the court held that in the highly complex antitrust area such questions should hardly
be resolved in an affidavit for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1150.
Instead it reserved the question of both cause in fact and policy cause for the merits,
183. 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
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ment that certain interests are worthy of protection; thus it is not difficult
for courts to find, as they do with express grants of review, that a violation
of such interests may in itself provide the necessary injury in fact. 5 1 Here
the zone of interests is incorporated into the injury in fact determination. 18 5
Such is the case with threatened environmental injuries. Without the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 186 it would be difficult to obtain
standing to complain about threatened harm to the environment since proof
that a specific personal injury will result from a challenged action is often
impossible.1l 7 However in NEPA Congress expressed a clear intent to protect
against potential environmental harm, 188 and required that an environmental impact study (EIS) be made whenever major federal action was contemplated.89 Thus Congress has made the underlying policy decision
balancing the conflicting interests of protection against future environmental
harm and the preservation of efficient governmental operations.
The question of the necessary causal nexus might still have caused great
conflict among the courts were it not for United States v. SCRAP.190 Courts
could have strictly interpreted the necessary causal showing, requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a harm personal to them would occur were it
not for failure to prepare an EIS.'9' However, the better view seems to be
that taken by the Ninth Circuit in City of Davis v. Colemen.19 2 In Davis
a municipality and individual plaintiffs challenged the government's failure
to conduct an EIS before deciding where to place an interstate interchange.
The court held that the district court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to
plead and prove actual damage ensuing from the statutory violation.193 Since
184. See McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (%V.D. Mo. 1975).
185. See City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), and notes 203208 infra and accompanying text.
186. 42 U.S.C. §§4321, 4331-4335 (1970).
187. See the opinions of the dissenting justices in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 741, 755 (1972) (Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Justice Douglas observed
that standing would be simplified in environmental cases if suits could be brought "in
the name of the inanimate object about to be dispoiled ....
IId. at 741.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§4341-4347 (1970). The statute has also been held to protect a secondary
class of interests whose invasion also affords standing: interests of governmental organizations, groups or individuals whose economic and social "environments" may potentially be
disrupted by a federal project. McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 225 (W.D. Mo.
1975).
189. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1970).
190. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
191. This approach would involve a heavy burden of proof that the harm would
actually occur and that it would specifically touch plaintiffs. This was essentially the
position of defendants and the minority in SCRAP: if the harm is indirect or attenuated,
plaintiffs must make a clear threshold showing of a causal nexus between the proposed
federal action and the environmental harm alleged. See note 81 supra.
192. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
193. Id. at 671 n.13. The court held that the lower court's description of the proper
test was "erroneous." Id. The court cited from the district court's unpublished opinion,
which had held that "the normal requisites of standing in environmental lawsuits [require] plaintiff to plead and prove actual damage ensuing from a statutory violation ....
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the challenged action was not the federal project itself, but the failure to
make the requisite EIS,9 4 the only allegation of injury necessary was that
this failure to study the environmental impact of the move might potentially
95
have a detrimental effect on the environment.
Somewhat similar to NEPA cases are those in which indigent plaintiffs
seek standing to challenge the misallocation of funds under federal antipoverty or community development programs. There are several policy
factors that may make courts more reluctant to entertain such suits. These
factors include the precedents of Warth and Eastern Kentucky, both of which
refused to recognize "lost opportunities" as a valid injury in fact;198 the
difficulty in shaping relief when funds have already been expended; 197 and,
most important, the general judicial disinclination to become involved in
administrative allocation of the "new property"' 98 without explicit congressional authorization. 99
194. Id. at 671. The injury, which is "procedural," is specifically the "creation of a
risk that serious environmental impacts will be overlooked." Id. Persons having a geographic
nexus with the site of the challenged project are those injured "since they may be
expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have." Id. at 672.
Thus the court has substituted the simpler "geographic nexus" requirement for a more
detailed look at the individual plaintiff's actual prospects of suffering. The court also
explicitly held that attenuation of the causal link between NEPA compliance and
possible substantial injury did not defeat standing. Id. at 671.
195. Under such an interpretation the causal showing is minimal; however, since the
merits themselves deal only with whether such an impact study is required, this seems
a reasonable requirement. Obviously the existence of NEPA tips the scales in favor of
requiring a minimal causal showing, not only because NEPA represents a congressional
determination that the courts should grant standing for a broad variety of fairly nebulous
and necessarily hypothetical interests, but also because of the limited role the court sets
for itself in these adjudications. Its purpose is not to determine whether in fact a causal
connection exists between the challenged action and environmental injury, but only whether
there is a sufficient threat of harm to warrant an agency study. Viewed in this light
SCRAP and the NEPA cases may be seen as standing for the limited proposition that
when a causal connection between a challenged action and harm-in-fact need not be
shown in order to prevail on the merits, it is not necessary for standing to reach those
issues. It is possible that this may be the approach taken in the future by the Burger
Court to reconcile SCRAP with its own more limited view of standing.
196. See notes 108-131 and 155-159 supra and accompanying text.
197. See Economic Opportunity Comm'n v. Weinberger, 524 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1975).
198. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
199. See Economic Opportunity Comm'n v. Weinberger, 524 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1975),
particularly the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly, Id. at 404-08, for a discussion
of the difficult policy factors involved in such situations. See also Urban Contractors Alliance
v. Bi-State Develop. Agy., 531 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1976), where plaintiffs claiming status as

employees, beneficiaries, participants and potential construction contractors challenged
alleged racial inequality in the administration of bus service in greater St. Louis. The
court was unable to find sufficient demonstration of specific injuries to individual plaintiffs
despite an "exhaustive search of the record." Id. at 880 n.3. However it also emphasized
the policy issues behind its reluctance to entertain the case: "The plaintiffs ask the courts
to withhold several thousand dollars in federal assistance which is earmarked for the

improvement of public transportation in the St. Louis area, alleging serious infringements
of basic civil rights by an agency of two sovereign states. Obviously the ramifications of
federal court interference here could be far-reaching and grave." Id. at 882.
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As in Warth and Eastern Kentucky, the definition of plaintiffs' injury
becomes crucial in these cases: should the courts hold plaintiffs to the
Warth causality test, requiring them to demonstrate that they have suffered
concrete losses because the funds were allocated elsewhere and, further, that
there is a strong likelihood that they will receive the funds if they win
on the merits?200 Some courts have taken this approach, arguing that there
is no injury in fact when plaintiffs cannot demonstrate such a loss.201 Others
20 2
In City of Hartford v. Hills2°a
have granted standing under a looser test.
low-income residents of Hartford were granted standing to challenge a HUD
approval of a grant application by seven nearby communities.20- The court
reasoned that the low-income plaintiffs were clearly within the zone of
interests of the relevant statute, 20 5 the Community Development Act. Since
20 6
the city council would be in a strong position to receive reallocated funds
if funds had been improperly allocated, "plaintiffs may well have lost the
benefits of redirected priorities by the applicant towns, or perhaps, the
benefits of projects implemented by the City of Hartford with any reallocated
funds." 20 7 Two aspects of this holding are significant: the court analyzed
200. See text accompanying notes 108-159 supra.
201. See, e.g., Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afj'd on rehearing,
537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976).
202. See Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975), where Warth's "tangible benefits" test was also rejected, although in dictum
only. Defendants argued that plaintiffs could not challenge their alleged misallocation of
funds under the Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §5311 (1970) unless they could
show that the challenged funds would be used in their neighborhood if they prevailed
on the merits. 404 F. Supp. at 788. Although the court decided the case on ripeness
grounds, it expressed concern that by following Warth's principle it would be "difficult
to imagine any low- or middle-income plaintiff with standing to challenge alleged improper
allocation of funds .......
ld.
203. 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
204. Plaintiffs claimed violations under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §5301 et seq. (1975 Supp.), Title VIII (Fair Housing)
of the Civil Rights Act of 19613, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970); and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq. (1970); as well as claims under the civil
rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1982, 1985 (1970) and the fifth amendment. 408 F. Supp.
at 892.
205. Id. at 895. It is relevant that in its standing analysis the court recognized
that it must determine the relationship of the claim to the statute, i.e., the "zone of
interests," before it could determine the injury in fact. Id. at 893-95. In fact the court
called the injury in fact requirement the "second prong" of the standing test. Id. at 894.
206. Id. at 894-95. Although plaintiff city officials also fell within the proper zone
of interests they lacked standing to challenge the HUD grant on the grounds that it
interfered with their ability to perform their official duties. Id. at 895.
207. Id. at 897. The court held that Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), was not
controlling because statutory claims were at issue. The controlling case at that time was
Evans v. Lynn, No. 74-1793 (2d June 2, 1975). In Evans the appellate court had found
standing in a similar situation despite the district court's holding that plaintiffs' "'injury'
[ghetto living conditions] is in no way linked to the particular grants complained of
herein. Nor would restraining deliverance of the federal funds in any way alleviate their
situation." 376 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). However, after City of Hartford was
decided, the Second Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel's opinion in Evans v. Lynn.
and affirmed the lower court's finding of no standing. 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976). The
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the injury in terms of the claim upon which it was based, permitting a
potential "lost opportunity" of a beneficial interest to suffice; 208 and, furthermore, it permitted a showing of a reasonable possibility of such a loss to
suffice, rather than applying the more stringent "but for" test.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has indicated a willingness to use the
Warth test in a "lost opportunity" zoning case when plaintiffs' interests
were less directly related to the protection of the statute in question. In
Topic v. Circle Realty209 a community volunteer organization brought a
civil rights action under the Fair Housing Act 210 against local realtors for
steering minority customers to designated minority residential areas. Plaintiffs
claimed that such practices encouraged continued patterns of segregation in
the communities from which the organization drew its membership. 211Although the court did not need to reach the issue, it indicated that it
would have denied standing by applying the Warth causality test:
[T]he role played by defendants' alleged racial steering in denying the
plaintiffs the benefits of living in an integrated community may be
so attenuated as to negate the existence of any injury in fact. It is
majority held that plaintiff's claim of damage (ghettoization) flowed only indirectly
from the challenged actions by which community development grants were given to
exclusive all-white suburbs allegedly in violation of the fair housing provisions of the
1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§2000d et seq., 2601 et seq. (1970), 537 F.2d at
593 n.34. Noting that the injury in fact analysis must be clearly distinguished from the
zone of interests tests, id. at 592, the court refused to accept the panel's finding that an
invasion of their statutory right to have programs and housing administered in furtherance
of fair housing policy was sufficient injury in fact. Id. at 577. Citing Warth at length, the
majority indicated that plaintiffs must demonstrate specific injuries in terms of lost
housing to meet the case or controversy requirement. Id. at 595. In strong dissents, the
minority justices argued that the majority had misperceived what plaintiffs' injury
comprised, Id. at 599-609 (Oakes, Kaufman, Feinberg, and Gurfein, JJ., dissenting). They
emphasized that plaintiffs had the requisite "personal stake" and that Congress had
intended to provide for review of federal grants such as these by persons such as plaintiffs
who were "adversely affected." Id. at 608. Furthermore, the exercise of judicial resolution
would not interfere with the separation of powers doctrine, id. at 609, but would, if anything, avoid such problems. "There is need for judicial action where Congress has mandated
benefits for a class and where an agency of the Executive Branch fails to carry out
that legislative mandate. The contrary would give the Executive Branch a silent veto not
provided in the Constitution." Id. at 611 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
208. In an earlier decision in the same case, 408 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1975), the
court dealt with defendants' claim that plaintiffs' "lost opportunity" claim was "bootstrapping": "The defendants' argument that this is 'bootstrapping' fails to understand
the nature of a lawsuit, and thereby seeks to convert possession from nine to ten tenths
of the law. It often happens that one party to a lawsuit will not have any present
interest in funds unless s/he is successful." Id. at 886 n.8.
209. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 160 (1976).
210. 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq. (1970).
211. Plaintiffs claimed a precedent in Trafjlcante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Supreme Court granted standing under the fair housing
act to tenants in an apartment complex who claimed that their landlord's alleged racial
discrimination denied them the benefits of living in an integrated community. However,
the court did not need to apply Traflicante since it held that the present action was
based on a more restrictive standing grant within the statute. 532 F.2d at 1275-76.
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quite possible that, even absent the defendents' discriminatory
212
practices, [the towns] would still be segregated communities.
This dictum is surprising, for it suggests that otherwise valid civil rights
cases might be defeated, since few plaintiffs would be able to account for
the numerous contingencies that might also contribute to racial discrimination in society, much less demonstrate that judicial intervention would clearly
have the hoped-for effect of alleviating discrimination. One need only look
at the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education213 to comprehend the
difficulty of showing a substantial likelihood that the ultimate injury will
be remedied.
As Topic demonstrates, the less direct the nexus between plaintiffs and
the benefits to flow from a particular government program or regulation,
the more likely that a court will find an insufficient causal relationship.
Once again the zone of interests can be determinative of injury in fact. In
Metcalf v.

National Petroleum Council,214

plaintiffs21 5

challenging

the

National Petroleum Council for failing to function in accord with the
requirements of federal energy legislation were denied standing despite their
allegations that they would be injured through higher costs for petroleum
products, potential environmental damage, and loss of benefits from the
development of alternate sources of energy.2 16 The court found these injuries
to be speculative and generalized.2 1

7

It also found a "further defect ' ' 21 8 in

plaintiffs' failure to meet the Warth causality test. Plaintiffs "failed to allege
facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that, absent defendants'
actions, the injuries alleged would not have occurred and that, if plaintiffs
are granted the relief they seek, the injuries would vanish." 219 This language
reveals the distorted focus of the Warth test, for never before have courts
held that a plaintiff, in order to obtain standing, 220 must demonstrate that
his injuries will "vanish" as a result of his lawsuit.
Even though there was an attenuated nexus and a challenged statute that
did not directly protect the plaintiffs, the District of Columbia district court

212.

Id. at 1275.

213. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
214. 407 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1976).
215. Plaintiffs included a United States Senator and a private citizen claiming status
as a consumer. Id. at 258.
216. They claimed that the Council and its subgroups were unlawfully functioning
"because they are not fairly balanced in membership and are improperly influenced by
certain petroleum industry special interests, contrary to the express requirements of
these statutes." Id.
217. Id. at 259.
218. Id. at 260.
219. Id. The court found no "record support" for plaintiffs' assumptions that things
would be different if the committee's membership changed. Id. at 261.
220. The court shares the concern of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972) that it will
be put into a position to monitor "the wisdom and soundness of [e]xecutive action," 407
F. Supp. at 261, citing 408 U.S. at 15, a position it clearly does not desire.
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still granted standing in Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Shultz.2 21 Plaintiff222
challenged a Revenue Ruling that allowed individual donors to escape substantial gift taxes on their contributions, 223 alleging that the ruling injured
an individual member of the plaintiff organization in that it "substantially
diminish[ed] his ability to affect the electoral process and to persuade elected
officials to adopt policies and programs he favored." 224 Although recognizing
that the causal link was "somewhat strained," 225 the court nevertheless granted
standing, no doubt swayed by the fundamental nature of the constitutional
interest asserted, 228 and by the fact that since Baker v. Carr22 plaintiffs
complaining of an adverse impact on their voting power have never been
required to show how the provision of a forum will improve the effectiveness
2
of their vote. 28
ConstitutionalCases
It is not dear how the courts will apply the Warth causal nexus test in
areas of constitutional adjudication. Arguably the prudential dimension of
the standing doctrine, relating to a desire to avoid difficult questions of
constitutional adjudication, plays a major role in the kind of causal showing
required. 22 9 However these considerations may be offset by indications of
strong congressional policy protecting certain interests. Thus when the injury
in zoning cases is racial discrimination rather than the inhibition of the
right to travel, courts may be more reluctant to ask plaintiffs to meet the
Warth causal showing test. In Ybarra v.City of San Jose,23 0 a pre-Warth case,
the Ninth Circuit struggled with issues similar to those in Warth but reached
an opposite result.
In Ybarra the plaintiffs231 alleged that defendants had discriminated in
221. 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974). Although the case was brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970), the court was dearly influenced by
the fundamental nature of the constitutional right involved. 376 F. Supp. at 898-99.
222. Plaintiffs included a nonprofit corporation organized to promote tax reform; an
unincorporated committee organized to influence the election of candidates; and an individual member and officer of the corporation, who claimed status as a taxpayer, citizen,
and a small contributor to election campaigns. Id. at 893, 898.
223. Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 532.
224. 376 F. Supp. at 898. Plaintiffs also alleged that the ruling reduced the influence
of small contributors while increasing the influence of large contributors. Id.
225. Id. at 899. However the Court found it "more persuasive than that which was
upheld in SCRAP .......
Id.
226. See Note, Nontaxpayer Challenges to Internal Revenue Service Rulemaking:
Constitutional and Statutory Barriers to Judicial Review, 63 GEo. L.J. 1263, 1272-77 (1975).
227. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
228. It is interesting to consider how the case might be decided in light of Eastern
Kentucky. If plaintiffs are required to meet the same "prospects of relief" test imposed on the
plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky, who were also challenging a revenue ruling, it could have
an important impact on all future voter suits since the test has been treated as a constitutional requirement. See note 159 supra.
229. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
230. 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974).
231. Plaintiffs included an unincorporated association, parents of school children and
others. Id. at 1041.
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granting variances, zoning, and building permits in such a way as to create
an ethnically imbalanced education system. 23 2 Although the court clearly
could have analyzed the situation as the Supreme Court was later to do in
Warth, ruling that the intervening economic situation was the "real cause"
of the resultant segregation, it did not. Pointing out that "[s]tate action
related to land use control, tainted by racial discrimination, had been held
' 233
violative of the Equal Protection Clause in a variety of other contexts,
the court concluded that it was "not prepared to hold at this stage of the
proceedings that relief is necessarily precluded because the injury complained
2 -34
of in this case, segregated schools, is one step removed from the cause."
As Ybarra demonstrates, the assertion of constitutional rights to be free
of race and sex discrimination is frequently sufficient to relax the type of
causal showing necessary for standing, both because of a strong congressional
policy in this area and because of the difficulty of proving exact causal relationships, even at trial. 235 The cases may also be distinguished by the fact that
racial discrimination was alleged as the injury in fact in Ybarra, and was not
merely, as in Warth, an indirect result of the alleged low-income exclusionary
zoning. Furthermore, in Ybarra plaintiffs challenged the town's discriminatory
granting of variances rather than general zoning which indirectly excluded
low-income persons.
In the area of first amendment rights the Warth causality test has also
had little immediate impact. In two post-Warth cases courts have granted
standing to plaintiffs claiming invasions of their first amendment rights
because of illegal surveillance, despite the precedents of Laird and Warth.
In Paton v. LaPrade236 the Third Circuit was willing to grant standing to
a high school student who alleged that the FBI's illegal possession of a dossier
with her name on it threatened injury to her since she eventually planned
to enter the foreign service. 23s Although the court clearly could have found,
as in O'Shea,231 that too many contingencies stood between the challenged
action and the threatened injury, and that therefore the injury was merely
speculative, instead it granted standing, holding that the plaintiff need not
232. Id. at 1044.
233. Id. at 1043.
234. Id. The plaintiffs' failure to own land in the affected areas was not a bar to
standing since "[t]he causal relationship between that injury [segregated schools] and the
alleged discriminatory administration of zoning ordinances is not so attenuated as to
deny standing at least to the minor plaintiffs." Id. at 1044.
235. For an exploration of the type of causal showing necessary in employment discrimination cases, see Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination
Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387, 391-93 (1975).
236. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
237. Id. at 868. The issue arose on a motion for summary judgment. The court
cited Warth for the proposition that the existence of the injury should be determined
from the pleadings and any "undisputed facts in the affidavits." Id. at 867. But it added
that "summary judgment denying standing should be entered only if the allegations of
injury are shams and the affidavits raise no genuine issues of fact." Id., citing United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689. Here it found sufficient allegations of an injury for
standing.
238. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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"point with mathematical certainty to the exact consequences" that would
flow from the government's possession of the files.23 9 The court was clearly
affected by the nature of the material in the file, 240 the allegations241of illegality,
and the fact that a specific injury to an individual was alleged.
242
A similar result was reached in Lowenstein v. Rooney, in which a legislator and former congressional candidate sued various government officials,
23
asking for the destruction of files acquired by illegal government surveillance.
The court found that the controversy was sufficiently delineated to survive
a motion to dismiss since the files were still in existence and the government's
actions were alleged to be illegal and in bad faith. 244 Significantly, the court
did not require any showing of a future impact from the existence of the
files.
CONCLUSION

Recent standing cases have introduced new questions into the already
complex standing field concerning the nature of the causal connection between
the challenged action and the injury. Although courts have always recognized
the need for a causal connection to have a "live" controversy, early standing
cases rarely turned on causal issues. It is only in recent years, with the
reduction of standing requirements to the single test of injury in fact, that
the causality issue has gained such prominence.
Much of the present confusion concerning causality seems attributable
to the amorphous nature of the injury in fact test. Although the test is
extremely useful in liberalizing standing if a clear tangible injury and a clear
causal nexus exist, it is practically meaningless as a guide if the injury is
less palpable and there is a more attenuated causal relationship between
the injury and the challenged action. Here a closer look at the possibilities
and limits of causal analysis is vital if the standing doctrine is to serve any
useful purpose in identifying the parties who will be heard in the federal
court.
Courts use causal determinations on standing in three situations: (1) to
eliminate cases when it is clear from the pleadings that the challenged action
is not or will not be a cause of the plaintiff's injury; 245 (2) to make policy
239. 524 F.2d at 868, citing Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
240. Plaintiff had mistakenly written for information from the Socialist Workers
Party as part of a class assignment. 524 F.2d at 865. As a result of a mail cover, FBI
records now included an index card bearing her name and a symbol for "subversive matter."
Id. at 866. The court noted that "history of a not too distant era has demonstrated
that future misuse of a file labeled 'subversive material' can prove extremely damaging."
Id. at 868.
241. The allegations of illegality and the concreteness of the injury distinguish the
facts from Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). See 524 F.2d at 868-69.
242. 401 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
243. The question before the court in this case, as with Paton and O'Shea, was whether
the "injuries claimed are not so subjective and non-specific as to justify invok[ing] the
judicial power .... " Id. at 956, citing Ex parte Ldvitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
244. Id. at 958-59.
245. See, e.g., Rodos v. Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1975); Independent Bankers
Assn. of America v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975).
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decisions, in line with tort proximate cause concepts, that the defendant
owes no duty to the plaintiff, and that therefore his illegal act has not
directly caused the injury; 2 46 and (3) to evaluate cases where complex factors

impinge on a more or less attenuated relationship between challenged action
and alleged injury in order to determine whether as a matter of constitutional law or judicial policy the controversy is sufficiently sharp to warrant
judicial intervention.

24

7

There is a place for causal analysis in standing decisions, particularly in
the first situation. Causal analysis, however, is misleading in the second instance, where "duty" concepts would be more appropriate. The third situation obviously requires the most attention, since here valid questions of
whether the injury/violation relationship is sufficiently close to present a
case or controversy may often be mixed with prudential considerations of
limiting judicial resources and avoiding constitutional determinations until
absolutely necessary. The nebulous nature of the injury in fact requirement,
particularly where no palpable economic injury is alleged, contributes to
this problem of mixing prudential and constitutional considerations without
sufficiently distinguishing between the two.
The Burger Court, confronting the third situation, has developed a new
rule for the requisite causal showing when the relationship between the
challenged action and the injury is attenuated or indirect. While this test
purports to be part of the constitutional standing requirement, it seems
instead to be an exercise of the court's prudential powers, since it requires
a type of showing which most federal plaintiffs have not been required to and probably could not - meet. Since the federal courts no longer recognize
policy reasons for denying standing, at least in determining whether the
injury in fact standard is met, the additional test serves to separate sharply
defined cases from those whose issues are less distinct. However this should
be recognized as a prudential use of the standing doctrine rather than as an
element of the constitutional injury in fact test.
Courts must recognize what they are doing when they make causal
decisions regarding standing. First they should distinguish, to the degree
possible, between cause in fact and policy cause questions. Second, they
should analyze the causal showing in terms of what is constitutionally required, following the Conley v. Gibson248 rule that any allegation of a
probable nexus is sufficient for constitutional case or controversy purposes. A
refusal to hear such a case might properly be based on the court's prudential
powers to refuse standing, or on the nonexistence of a claim for relief, but
not on the lack of a justiciable case or controversy. Finally, courts should
attempt to analyze the injury in fact in terms of the claim upon which it is
based to avoid imposing impossibly high cause in fact requirements on plaintiffs
who are alleging injury to a beneficial opportunity.
246. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); but see Relf v.
Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1974).

247. See Topic v. Circle Realty Co., 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
160 (1976).
248. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 4
1977]

THE CAUSAL NEXUS

285

While it is unlikely that many standing decisions will clearly articulate
the various factors that underlie a particular causal finding, an awareness of
the elements that play a role may help future courts base their decisions on
reasonably neutral principles. Perhaps some direction can be found in
examining the approach the lower federal courts have developed in handling
causal questions. These courts are clearly engaging in a balancing test in
determining what causal showing is necessary for standing by weighing the
traditional constitutional and prudential reasons for refusing standing where
an insufficient or attenuated causal nexus exists against factors which favor
a looser causal nexus. Although the result is a fluctuating causal test that
varies with the conditions of each case, rather than a steady application of a
single principle, given the variety of cases in which the issue arises, and the
amorphous nature of the injury in fact standard, perhaps this is the only
functional solution.
MARY P. TWITCIELL
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